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Tax Reform on Homeownership 
MARGARET RYZNAR* 
The 2017 tax reform, by curtailing the deductions for 
mortgage interest and state and local taxes, frustrates the 
American public policy of encouraging homeownership. Yet, 
there are many reasons that public policy has encouraged 
homeownership for decades. Most importantly, homeowner-
ship is an important savings tool for Americans—and tax re-
form should be mindful of it.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States is a country of homeownership.1 Yet, the 2017 
tax legislation reduced the support for homeownership, imposing 
                                                                                                                            
 *  Professor of Law, Indiana University McKinney School of Law. 
 1  “America has long been a land of homeowners, from the 19th century 
homesteaders moving west to the 21st century families moving to the exurbs, all 
striving to stake claim to the American dream and own their own home.” Heather 
K. Way, Informal Homeownership in the United States and the Law, 29 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 113, 116 (2009). For a history of homeownership in the United 
States, see generally William A. Fischel, The Evolution of Homeownership, 77 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1503 (2010).  
This love affair with single-family housing has shaped the 
American landscape. During the post-World War II building 
 
228 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:227 
new limitations on the deduction of home mortgage interest and real 
property taxes.2 There are important reasons to continue supporting 
homeownership benefits,3 but often overlooked is the role of hous-
                                                                                                                            
boom, European countries generally built apartments, while the 
U.S. was transformed from a nation of renters to a nation of 
homeowners by massive tax subsidies to homeowners as well 
as the restructuring of home financing by FHA and VA mort-
gages. The result is geography dominated by suburbs and a 
housing market dominated by owners. 
Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 328 (1998) [here-
inafter Williams, Rhetoric]. 
 2  See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), Pub. L. No. 115-97, 
131 Stat. 2054 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). A goal of the 
reform was to simplify the tax code and grow the economy. “By modifying or 
eliminating certain tax preferences, the government can address some of the rev-
enue shortfalls without raising taxes.” Phyllis C. Taite, Taxes, the Problem and 
Solution: A Model for Vanishing Deductions and Exclusions for Residence-Based 
Tax Preferences, 59 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 361, 362 (2015). In recent years, “[t]ax 
subsidies to homeowners (wherein homeowners write mortgage interest off of 
their taxable income) amounted to a $119.3 billion subsidy nationwide.” john a. 
powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair Housing Act at 
40, 41 IND. L. REV. 605, 623 (2008).  
Tax incentives for homeownership are some of the most expen-
sive subsidies in the Internal Revenue Code. The mortgage in-
terest deduction, the exclusion of gain from the sale of a primary 
residence and the deduction for real property taxes together cost 
$183.83 billion annually in lost revenue, and that number is 
growing rapidly. The mortgage interest deduction alone is a 
$119.75 billion annual tax expenditure. 
Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing Bubble: 
How and Why the Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 751, 753 (2012). 
 3  See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Technology, Information, and Bankruptcy, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 307 (“Living in one’s own home is often touted as an 
integral part of the American Dream, and promoting homeownership is often an 
explicit government policy.”); Allison D. Christians, Breaking the Subsidy Cycle: 
A Proposal for Affordable Housing, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 131, 145 
(1999) (“Homeownership has long been identified with the ‘American dream.’ It 
is considered to be ‘a basic value in American society’ and a ‘national good.’”); 
Michael S. Knoll, Taxation, Negative Amortization and Affordable Mortgages, 53 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1341, 1378 (1992) (“Homeownership is a cherished part of the 
American dream.”). 
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ing as a savings mechanism. The tax law on retirement favors sav-
ing,4 but most Americans do not save enough. Instead, they put 
much of their money toward homeownership.5  Many of the ad-
vantages of saving and homeownership are the same—except sav-
ings are parked in homes instead of 401(k)s.   
The United States is thus a country of homeownership instead of 
retirement saving.6 This reality should give lawmakers pause when 
changing the tax-favorability of homeownership, by arguing in fa-
vor of expanding instead of restricting the tax benefits of homeown-
ership. At the very least, to maintain consistency, it makes sense to 
subsidize homeownership as much as retirement because many 
Americans cannot afford both, and they serve similar purposes.7 
Accordingly, this Article argues that homeownership is an im-
portant savings vehicle justifying tax breaks. Part I begins by con-
sidering the tax incentives for retirement saving. Part II does so for 
homeownership. Part III examines the relationship between home-
ownership and saving, while Part IV considers its implications for 
tax reform. This Article then concludes that just as the tax law in-
centivizes retirement saving, it should also provide incentives for 
homeownership. 
                                                                                                                            
 4  See Kiran Iyer, Nudging Virtue, 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 469, 477 (2017) 
(“Governments have an interest in ensuring that people have retirement savings, 
given that their capacity to live well in the future depends in part on their material 
well-being. Therefore, lawmakers must seriously consider the effectiveness of any 
policy aimed at increasing savings rates. However, the analysis of consequences 
would not exhaust the inquiry.”). 
 5  See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics 
of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 21 (2009) (“The effect of homeown-
ership on household wealth has been greatest among young, low-income, and mi-
nority households, which often have very few non-home assets.”). 
 6  See supra note 1; see also Tara Twomey & Todd F. Maynes, Protecting 
Nest Eggs and Other Retirement Benefits in Bankruptcy, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 
236–41 (2016). 
 7  See also infra Section III.B. See generally JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES 
OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2017, at 5 (2017), 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/harvard_jchs_state_of_the_na-
tions_housing_2017_0.pdf (discussing that the unaffordability of housing and 
homeownership has left 38.9 million households cost-burdened).  
 
230 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:227 
I. TAX INCENTIVES FOR RETIREMENT SAVING 
Governments can either incentivize saving or require it among 
their citizens.8 Like many countries, the United States has chosen to 
incentivize it, including through the tax law. Whether through finan-
cial incentives or penalties, tax drives people’s behavior.9 There are 
several ways to incentivize behavior through tax, including by 
                                                                                                                            
 8  This is different from “nudging” people into saving. See Iyer, supra note 4, 
at 469. Without either, it is unlikely that people will save as much for retirement. 
See, e.g., Ryan Bubb, Patrick Corrigan & Patrick L. Warren, A Behavioral Con-
tract Theory Perspective on Retirement Savings, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1317, 1317 
(2015) (“The primary motivation for retirement savings policy is the view that 
many of us, if left to our own devices, will not save enough for retirement.”).  
 9  A classic example is the charitable deduction. See, e.g., Patrick E. Tolan, 
Jr., Compromising the Safety Net: How Limiting Tax Deductions for High-Income 
Donors Could Undermine Charitable Organizations, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 329, 
329 (2013) (noting the importance of the charitable deduction to giving). For a 
background on tax incentives for corporations, see Margaret Ryznar & Karen 
Woody, A Framework on Mandating Versus Incentivizing Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1667, 1680–81 (2015). “Policymakers also under-
stand the motivation of corporate managers to minimize taxes and rely on corpo-
rate managers to respond to incentives to engage in certain activities—such as 
investing in new equipment or research and development—put in the tax law.” 
Mark J. Cowan, A GAAP Critic’s Guide to Corporate Income Taxes, 66 TAX LAW. 
209, 232 (2012). 
  Another example is the marriage penalty in the tax code. For the argument 
that economic incentives drive women’s behavior, see EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, 
TAXING WOMEN 19–23 (1997) (noting that because married couples often view 
the wife’s income as supplemental, which is taxed at higher marginal rates, the 
tax code provides a disincentive for married women to work); Edward J. 
McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases 
in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1033, 1040–41 (1993) (arguing that Congress 
should lower married women’s tax rates to encourage both marriage and married 
women’s participation in the labor force); Jennifer L. Venghaus, Comment, Tax 
Incentives: A Means of Encouraging Research and Development for Homeland 
Security?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1213, 1220 (2003) (suggesting that the tax code 
can change society’s behavior). However, other scholars have suggested that the 
tax code does not influence people’s behavior, but that people’s behavior influ-
ences the tax code. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the 
Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1392 (1975) (arguing that the tax code codifies 
social mores); Erik M. Jensen, Book Review, 5 PITT. TAX REV. 165, 170 n.16 
(2008) (reviewing JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK (2006)) 
(“Sexism might be involved in creating misguided societal expectations, but, on 
its face, the Code is indifferent to whether husband or wife is the primary wage-
earner.”). 
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providing a tax deduction that reduces taxable income10 or a tax 
credit that reduces tax liability dollar for dollar.11     
“[F]or more than forty years . . . , nearly every presidential ad-
ministration has tried to act creatively to incentivize private retire-
ment savings. Unsurprisingly, somewhat unconventional vehicles, 
such as the Roth IRA, have come about because the government has 
not been fully successful in its efforts.”12 These tax incentives are 
often seen as helping the middle class.13 Saving for retirement on 
any scale today can help people in the future, particularly younger 
people who benefit from compound interest.14   
The IRA was an early-tax favored savings tool. “The IRA is a 
type of tax-favored personal savings plan originating in 1974 under 
ERISA as a tax-favored retirement savings opportunity to those in-
dividuals not participating in an employer-sponsored plan.”15 The 
                                                                                                                            
 10  Mildred Wigfall Robinson, It Takes a Federalist Village: A Revitalized 
Property Tax as the Linchpin for Stable, Effective K-12 Public Education Funding, 
17 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 549, 582 (2014) (“An example [on tax deductions] may 
be helpful here. Assume . . . A . . . [has] paid $1000 under [a] local property tax. 
Taxpayer A is an itemizer whose income places him in a 15% marginal rate 
bracket. . . . Because A is able to take the [$1000] deduction, A will not have to 
pay $150 in income tax. A’s property tax expense has been subsidized by the 
federal treasury . . . .”).  
 11  “Unlike an income tax deduction, a credit is taken after tentative federal 
income tax liability has been determined. It is a dollar-for-dollar reduction of fed-
eral tax liability that would otherwise be borne.” Id. at 583. 
 12  Ausher M. B. Kofsky, Rehabilitating Frankenstein’s Monster: Repairing 
the Public Policy of the Roth IRA, 80 ALB. L. REV. 161, 182 (2017). 
 13  For a discussion on the relationship between tax policy and middle-class 
identity in Canada, see Lisa Philipps, Registered Savings Plans and the Making 
of Middle-Class Canada: Toward a Performative Theory of Tax Policy, 84 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2677, 2677, 2685, 2687 (2016) (suggesting that tax-incentivized sav-
ing in Canada resulted from consumption tax theory, fiscal federalism, and ne-
oliberalism). 
 14  “According to legend, Albert Einstein once said that compound interest is 
the most powerful force in the universe.” Robert M. Lloyd, Discounting Lost Prof-
its in Business Litigation: What Every Lawyer and Judge Needs to Know, 9 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 9, 9, 12 (2007) (“[Discounting to present value] 
is the converse of compound interest, and, like compound interest, discounting to 
present value is based on the time value of money.”). 
 15  John K. Eason, Retirement Security Through Asset Protection: The Evolu-
tion of Wealth, Privilege, and Policy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159, 190 n.114 
(2004) (citing Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. 
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Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) set 
an annual maximum deductible contribution limit of $1,500 per 
year,16 but the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (“ERTA”) in-
creased the annual IRA deduction limit to $2,000 and expanded eli-
gibility for the IRA deduction to all taxpayers.17 
In 1978, President Carter signed the Revenue Act of 1978, which 
allowed employers to provide 401(k) defined contribution retire-
ment plans at work.18 Employees could then redirect a portion of 
their paycheck to the account, which would be deferred to later with-
drawals, without paying federal income tax.19 The Roth IRA did not 
become available until the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.20 The Roth 
IRA is similar to the IRA, except the owner prepays the tax and later 
withdraws money tax-free.21Also, in the mid-twentieth century, § 
403(b) came into the tax code for the benefit of employees of certain 
tax-exempt organizations. 22  Functionally, 403(b) is similar to 
401(k)s.23 
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2001 (“EGTRRA”) raised the various contribution limits on these 
accounts.24 For example, the annual allowable contribution amounts 
                                                                                                                            
L. No. 93-406, § 2002, 88 Stat. 829, 958–71 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C.)) (“amending the Internal Revenue Code to include IRAs”).  
 16  See 26 U.S.C. § 219(b)(1) (1974) (amended 1981) (setting the maximum 
deduction amount allowable to not exceed fifteen percent of annual gross income 
or $1,500, whichever is less). 
 17  See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 
Stat. 172 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); STAFF OF THE 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECO-
NOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 199 (Comm. Print 1981). 
 18  See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 
2785–87 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 401 (2012)). 
 19  Id. 
 20  See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 302, 111 Stat. 788, 
825–28 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 408A (2012)). 
 21  For an excellent discussion of the differences between IRAs and Roth IRAs, 
see Kofsky, supra note 12, at 162–63. 
 22  See David A. Pratt, Very Serious Business: Sense and Nonsense Under 
Section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1197, 
1200, 1204 (1996). 
 23  Id. at 1227. 
 24  See generally Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
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for traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs increased to $5,000 per person, 
then indexed to inflation. 25  EGTRRA also allowed additional 
“catch-up contributions” of $1,000 per year for taxpayers aged fifty 
or older.26 Finally, EGTRRA raised the maximum amount that em-
ployees could contribute to their employer 401(k) and 403(b) retire-
ment plans to $15,000, indexing it to inflation.27 For these plans, 
EGTRRA included a catch-up annual amount of $5,000 for employ-
ees aged at least fifty.28  
IRAs, Roth IRAs, 401(k)s, and 403(b)s provide several retire-
ment savings options. 29  Other developments have included the 
starter Roth IRA called “My Retirement Account” or “MyRA.”30 
MyRA is a government-administered Roth IRA for moderate- and 
low-income employees who do not have access to an employer re-
tirement plan. 31  Once the balance in this starter account either 
reaches $15,000 or the starter account has been open for thirty years, 
the balance is transferred to a private Roth IRA.32 
While in the most recent tax reform discussions there were pro-
posals to lower the cap on pretax 401(k) contributions, no significant 
or structural changes were ultimately made to the tax-preferred re-
tirement savings plans.33 Thus, as suggested by the tax reform, law-
makers have decided that making changes to the 401(k) and other 
retirement options is too politically risky.34  
                                                                                                                            
 25  26 U.S.C. § 219(b)(5) (2012). 
 26  Id. at § 219(b)(5)(B). 
 27  Id. at § 402(g). 
 28  Id. 
 29  See Richard L. Kaplan & Kate S. Poorbaugh, What’s the Matter with Re-
tirement Savers?, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1296 (2015). 
 30  Id. at 1289. 
 31  Id. at 1292–94. 
 32  Id. at 1290. 
 33  See Naomi Jagoda, Trump Promises: ‘NO Change to Your 401(k),’ HILL 
(Oct. 23, 2017, 7:57 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/356658-trump-prom-
ises-no-change-to-your-401k (“President Trump on Monday tweeted that changes 
won’t be made to 401(k) plans after reports that congressional Republicans were 
considering a major alteration to the retirement accounts in forthcoming tax-re-
form legislation.”). 
 34  See Joseph Lawler, Trump Jumps Ahead GOP Tax Reform Effort with 
401(k) Tweet, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 23, 2017, 8:58 PM), https://www.washing-
tonexaminer.com/trump-jumps-ahead-gop-tax-reform-effort-with-401-k-tweet. 
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At the end of 2015, Americans owned $24 trillion in retirement 
assets.35 The composition of that 2015 year-end total was as follows: 
IRAs, $7.5 trillion; defined contribution plans, $6.5 trillion; private 
defined benefit plans, $2.9 trillion; state and local government pen-
sion plans, $3.7 trillion; federal pension plans, $1.5 trillion; and an-
nuities, $2 trillion.36  
Yet, most Americans are not saving enough for retirement.37 Al-
most half of all working-age families have no retirement account 
savings.38 For those families with retirement account savings, the 
median amount was recently around $60,000.39 However, people 
need to save several times their income by retirement.40 People are 
also not saving enough in general—most combined checking and 
savings accounts have under $1,000.41  
Nevertheless, saving for retirement is more important than ever. 
Social Security funds will run out by 2034,42 yet they were never 
intended to be the sole source of retirement income.43 Happily, life 
expectancy is increasing; however, it prolongs the retirement 
years.44 Finally, “the shift to employee-directed retirement savings 
has resulted in ‘the greatest retirement crisis in history,’ in which 
                                                                                                                            
 35  See Report: The US Retirement Market, Second Quarter 2018, INV. COM-
PANY INST.: RES. & STAT., https://www.ici.org/research/stats/retirement (follow 
“Report: The US Retirement Market, First Quarter 2018” hyperlink under “Quar-
terly Retirement Market Data”) (last updated Sept. 27, 2018). 
 36  See id. 
 37  Twomey & Maynes, supra note 6, at 240–41.  
 38  Id. at 236–37. 
 39  MONIQUE MORRISSEY, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE STATE OF AMERICAN RE-
TIREMENT: HOW 401(K)S HAVE FAILED MOST AMERICAN WORKERS 15 (2016), 
https://www.epi.org/files/2016/state-of-american-retirement-final.pdf. 
 40  See, e.g., How Much Do I Need to Save for Retirement?, FIDELITY (Aug. 
21, 2018), https://www.fidelity.com/viewpoints/retirement/how-much-money-
do-i-need-to-retire. 
 41  Terrence Cain, The Bankruptcy of Refusing to Hire Persons Who Have 
Filed Bankruptcy, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 657, 692 (2017). 
 42  Soc. Sec. & Medicare Bds. of Trs., A Summary of the 2018 Annual Reports, 
SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/ (last visited Sept. 7, 
2018). 
 43  See Ilan Moscovitz, 5 Huge Myths About Social Security, MOTLEY FOOL 
(Oct. 15, 2012, 12:00 AM), https://www.fool.com/retirement/general/2012 
/10/15/5-huge-myths-about-social-security.aspx. 
 44  See Scott D. Makar, A Modest Proposal: Raise the Mandatory Judicial 
Retirement Age, 18 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 51, 55 (2016). 
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many elderly Americans will have insufficient retirement sav-
ings.”45     
Sub-optimal retirement savings may be a result of either mis-
placed optimism about the future or an inability to save because of 
economic factors such as low-wage growth.46 Additionally, people 
may prefer instant rather than delayed gratification.47 One commen-
tator has blamed sub-optimal retirement savings on bad worker de-
faults, bad employer incentives, and low income.48 Better advertis-
ing may help encourage saving,49 or perhaps people must change 
their way of thinking in order to save enough.50  
                                                                                                                            
 45  Jill E. Fisch et al., The Knowledge Gap in Workplace Retirement Investing 
and the Role of Professional Advisors, 66 DUKE L.J. 633, 634 (2016). 
 46  This may be true of tax-incentivized savings in other countries too, such as 
Canada. There is “mounting evidence that [savings tax incentives] are ineffective 
or inadequate solutions” to the problems of “economic insecurity and precarity.” 
Philipps, supra note 13, at 2678. To help address the difficulty of saving for low-
income families, the saver’s credit in the United States tax code “offers a 50 per-
cent nonrefundable credit on funds up to $2,000 for individuals ($4,000 for mar-
ried couples filing jointly) deposited into a retirement savings account—such as a 
401(k), IRA account, or Roth IRA account—for households with low incomes.” 
Adi Libson, Confronting the Retirement Savings Problem: Redesigning the 
Saver’s Credit, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 228 (2017). 
 47  Morrow, supra note 2, at 787–88 (“Humans strongly prefer immediate pay-
offs relative to delayed payoffs.”). For a discussion of other reasons for the lack 
of retirement saving in the United States, see generally Daniel Shaviro, Multiple 
Myopias, Multiple Selves, and the Under-Saving Problem, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1215 
(2015). 
 48  See Deepa Das Acevedo, Addressing the Retirement Crisis with Shadow 
401(k)s, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 38, 39–46 (2016). 
 49  “We’d like to see as many advertisements for lifetime savings accounts as 
we do for lipstick and light beer.” Michael Kranish, Life Insurers Fight Major 
Bush Initiative, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 20, 2005), http://bi.galegroup.com/essentials/ 
article/GALE%7CA127359395/a84e58e8c0cf0ecd526f18c0bb333e31?u=mi-
ami_richter (quoting Pamela Olson, former Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax 
Policy). 
 50  See Derek Thompson, Why Don’t Americans Save More Money?, ATLAN-
TIC (Apr. 19, 2016),	https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/why-
dont-americans-save-money/478929/. For an analysis on why the law should take 
into account people’s cognition in designing retirement policy, see Peter H. Huang, 
Achieving American Retirement Prosperity by Changing Americans’ Thinking 
About Retirement, 22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 189 (2017). 
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Americans’ financial illiteracy is also problematic.51 After peo-
ple put aside money for retirement, they must select their invest-
ments.52 Nearly half of Americans saving for retirement in self-di-
rected accounts say they feel “not confident” or only “slightly con-
fident” that they will make good investment decisions.53 
Many foreign countries similarly encourage saving by offering 
relevant tax advantages. For example, in 2009, Canada began its 
Tax-Free Savings Account (“TFSA”) program.54 Any Canadian res-
ident age 18 or older with a Social Insurance Number can open a 
Tax-Free Savings Account, even without an earned income.55 The 
annual contribution limit is $5,500, which increases with inflation 
over time.56 However, people can indefinitely carry forward their 
unused contribution amounts until they hit the cumulative maxi-
mum, which was $57,500 in 2018.57 They can also re-contribute the 
amounts they withdrew the previous year, up to the cumulative max-
imum.58 There is no tax deduction for contributing to a TFSA.59 
                                                                                                                            
 51  See Jeffrey T. Dinwoodie, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Financial Illiteracy, the 
Mortgage Market Collapse, and the Global Economic Crisis, 18 U. MIAMI BUS. 
L. REV. 181, 182 (2010) (“Countless surveys and studies portray an unfortunate 
reality: millions of Americans—both young and old—are financially illiterate.”). 
 52  See Ultimate Guide to Retirement: Where Should I Put My Retirement 
Money?, CNN MONEY, https://money.cnn.com/retirement/guide/investing_bas 
ics.moneymag/index3.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2018). 
 53  JEFF LARRIMORE ET AL., DIV. OF CONSUMER & CMTY. AFFAIRS, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 
OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2015, at 63 (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov 
/2015-report-economic-well-being-us-households-201605.pdf. 
 54  For more detailed information on the TFSA, see The Tax-Free Savings Ac-
count, GOV’T OF CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services 
/tax/individuals/topics/tax-free-savings-account.html (last modified Nov. 24, 
2016) [hereinafter TFSA]. 
 55  Id.; The Tax-Free Savings Account (TFSA), Guide for Individuals, GOV’T 
OF CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/forms-publications 
/publications/rc4466/tax-free-savings-account-tfsa-guide-individuals.html#contr 
ibutions (last modified Apr. 17, 2018) [hereinafter TFSA, Guide for Individuals]. 
 56  See TFSA, Guide for Individuals, supra note 55. 
 57  Id.; The Max You Can Contribute to Your TFSA for 2018, MONEYSENSE 
(Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.moneysense.ca/save/investing/tfsa/tfsa-limit-max-
contr ibute/. 
 58  TFSA, Guide for Individuals, supra note 55. 
 59  TFSA, supra note 54. 
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However, the tax benefit is that people can make tax-free withdraw-
als, including earned interest, dividends, and capital gains.60 “This 
tax-free compound growth means that . . . money grows more 
quickly in a TFSA than in a taxable account.”61 Furthermore, people 
can withdraw money tax-free from their TFSA at any time,62 mak-
ing it a flexible investment account that helps people meet both their 
short- and long-term goals.63   
The United Kingdom offers similar incentives for saving in the 
form of an Individual Savings Account (“ISA”).64 ISAs come in 
four types: cash ISAs, stocks and shares ISAs, innovative finance 
ISAs, and Lifetime ISAs.65 People can save up to £20,000 in one 
type of ISA or split across other types of ISAs.66 However, people 
“can only pay £4,000 into [their] Lifetime ISA in a tax year.”67 Pay-
ments into the account are made from after-tax income.68 The ac-
count is exempt from income tax and capital gains tax on the invest-
ment returns and no tax is payable on money withdrawn.69 “[People] 
can take [their] money out of an [ISA] at any time, without losing 
                                                                                                                            
 60  Id.; TFSA, Guide for Individuals, supra note 55. 
 61  Tax-Free Savings (TFSA), VANGUARD CREDIT UNION, https://van-
guardcu.mb.ca/agriculture/agricultural-savings/savings/ (last visited Aug. 30, 
2018); accord Melissa Leong, Here Are the 10 Most Misunderstood Things About 
TFSAs, FIN. POST (Aug. 12, 2014, 5:10 PM), https://business.financial-
post.com/personal-finance/tfsa-misunderstood. 
 62  TFSA, Guide for Individuals, supra note 55. 
 63  See Dan Bortolotti, TFSAs for Young Savers, MONEYSENSE (Sept. 25, 
2015), https://www.moneysense.ca/save/investing/tfsa/tfsas-for-young-savers/. 
 64  See David Rotfleisch, Canadian Tax Treatment of Individual Saving Ac-
counts in the United Kingdom – A Toronto Tax Lawyer Analysis, CANADIAN TAX 
AMNESTY (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.canadiantaxamnesty.ca/article/individ-
ual-savings-account/?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndicaion&utm_ca 
mpaign=View-Original (“Essentially, ISAs are the UK-equivalent of Canadian 
Tax-Free Savings Accounts.”). 
 65  For more detailed information on ISAs, see Individual Savings Accounts 
(ISAs), GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/individual-savings-accounts/print (last vis-
ited Aug. 25, 2018). 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. 
 68  ISA Guide, GIBRALTAR ASSET MGMT., http://www.gam.gi/uploads/files/ 
Trading%20Notes/Other/2012/isa%20guide.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).  
 69  Id.; Individual Savings Account (ISAs), supra note 65. 
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any tax benefits.”70 Similar to the TFSA, the ISA helps people plan 
for both short- and long-term goals.71 
Both TFSAs and ISAs address the criticism of the American re-
tirement patchwork of the 401(k), 403(b), IRA, and Roth IRA72 
(dubbed “alphabet soup”).73 These foreign models also cure peo-
ple’s fear of locking up their money for decades,74 especially for 
lower income families that may have emergency expenses arise.75 
Currently in the United States, it is generally difficult to access re-
tirement savings without paying an early withdrawal penalty.76  
These foreign savings models thus have advantages that may 
spur saving,77 which is the goal of American policy as well.78 The 
models can be implemented in the United States by either adapting 
the Roth IRA or adding another kind of savings account to the cur-
rent options; in fact, several legislative efforts have already at-
tempted to introduce them to the American tax landscape.79 
In sum, there are several tax breaks to help retirement saving, 
but many Americans do not use them to the maximum extent. In-
stead, people put much of their extra income into another savings 
vehicle: homeownership. 
                                                                                                                            
 70  Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs), supra note 65. 
 71  See id.; Bortolotti, supra note 63. 
 72  Kofsky, supra note 12, at 182. 
 73  Hubert Bromma, Sipping the Alphabet Soup of Retirement Savings, 
FORBES (Mar. 27, 2007, 6:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2007/03/27/401k-ira-
sep-pf-ie-in_hb_0327soapbox_inl.html#7ec579a83289. 
 74  See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its 
Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1626 (2014).  
 75  See LARRIMORE ET AL., supra note 53, at 21–26. 
 76  See Michael Flynn & Craig C. Minko, Personal Foul . . . Roughing the 
Taxpayer: The IRS’ Triple Penalty on Hardship Distributions, 17 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 15, 43–44 (2012) (“Generally, hardship withdrawals are subject 
to a 10% early distribution penalty if they are made before the participant reaches 
the age of 59 ½.”). 
 77  See supra text accompanying notes 54–71. 
 78  See Kofsky, supra note 12, at 168–69. 
 79  A bill has already been introduced by Republican Senator Jeff Flake from 
Arizona and Republican Representative Dave Brat from Virginia to set up univer-
sal savings accounts, which would be similar to Roth IRAs except that account 
holders could withdraw money at any time. See, e.g., Universal Savings Account 
Act, S. 323, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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II. TAX INCENTIVES FOR HOMEOWNERSHIP 
The United States is a country of homeownership.80 The tax 
laws have supported and subsidized it for almost a century,81 and 
much of American saving has been directed toward it. 82 Although 
the fundamental point of tax is to raise revenue for the government, 
public policy exceptions long existed for homeownership, which the 
2017 tax legislation curtailed.83 
A. Pre-Reform Tax Law on Homeownership 
For the last century, the tax laws have encouraged homeowner-
ship.84 In addition, states have offered tax provisions favorable to 
                                                                                                                            
 80  See supra note 1.  
 81  “The United States has supported and subsidized homeownership for well 
over a century.” A. Mechele Dickerson, Public Interest, Public Choice, and the 
Cult of Homeownership, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 843, 845 (2012) [hereinafter Dick-
erson, Public Interest]. 
 82  Elizabeth Warren, The Over-Consumption Myth and Other Tales of Eco-
nomics, Law, and Morality, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1485, 1495 (2004) [hereinafter 
Warren, The Over-Consumption Myth]. 
 83  See infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
 84  See Dickerson, Pubic Interest, supra note 81, at 845–46 (“Abraham Lin-
coln signed the Homestead Act to encourage people to move west and establish 
households. After the Great Depression, the federal government’s participation in 
housing markets increased dramatically and President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
New Deal interventions completely transformed the mortgage finance market. Re-
cent White House policies and programs also promote homeownership. These in-
itiatives include President Clinton’s National Homeownership Strategy, President 
George W. Bush’s initiative to expand homeownership for all Americans, and 
President Barack Obama’s Home Affordable Modification Program. These pro-
grams had one goal: increase and maintain the number of homeowners.”); see also 
Michael Lind, The Smallholder Society, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 143, 143 
(2007) (“In recent years, the idea of promoting widespread property ownership in 
the United States by means of public policy has enjoyed a renaissance across the 
political spectrum.”). 
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homeownership. 85  For example, many states have property tax 
homeownership exemptions and senior discount rates.86  
On the federal level, tax reform in 1986 created the Housing 
Credit to provide an incentive to the private sector to create and pre-
serve affordable housing.87 The Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act of 2008 established a tax credit for first-time homebuyers that 
was worth up to $7,500.88 There has also been an exclusion of up to 
$250,000 per person on the gain from the sale of a home, with the 
remaining gain taxed at the capital gains rates.89 Additional tax de-
ductions include expenses related to home offices and moving.90  
However, a major tax benefit to homeowners has been the mort-
gage interest deduction, even though personal interest is not ordi-
narily deductible.91 For tax years prior to 2018, the mortgage inter-
est deduction was allowed on a primary and/or secondary home as 
                                                                                                                            
 85  Lind, supra note 84, at 156–57. Also, “in some states, such as Florida, a 
homeowner values the home as asset protection and wealth building for the next 
generation.” Taite, supra note 2, at 374. “Florida has very generous homestead 
protections for homeowners. Homes are not subject to most creditor claims, and 
these protections can be transferred to the heirs of the homeowner.” Id. at 374 
n.90.  
 86  See Lind, supra note 84, at 156–57. 
 87  See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252, 100 Stat. 2085, 
2189–2208 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2012)). 
 88  Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 
3011, 122 Stat. 2654, 2888 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 36 (2012)). 
 89  See 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2012) (provides reduced rates for capital gains); § 
121(b)(1); § 1221(a) (classifies a personal residence as a capital asset); § 1222 
(clarifies that the gain on the sale or exchange of a capital asset is capital gain).  
 90  See Roberta F. Mann, On the Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives Trans-
portation Choice, 24 VA. TAX REV. 587, 624 (2005). 
 91  § 163(h). “American homeowners may deduct from their taxable income 
an amount equal to the interest they paid during the tax year on any loan which is 
secured by their first or second residence, up to a ceiling amount on the loan.” 
David Frederick, Reconciling Intentions with Outcomes: A Critical Examination 
of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 28 AKRON TAX J. 41, 43 (2013). However, 
“[i]t is more of an exception to an exception to a rule, and its complexity prohibits 
a direct recitation.” Id. at 42. “Indeed, the historical record fails to indicate why 
Congress allowed a deduction for personal interest in 1913. Commentators have 
surmised that the deductibility of consumer interest ‘may have been less a matter 
of principle than a reflection of the practical difficulty of distinguishing personal 
from profit-seeking interest.’” Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A 
History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 L. & CONTEMP. 
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long as the mortgage did not exceed $1 million.92 Also deductible 
was interest paid on up to $100,000 of home equity debt loans, the 
proceeds of which could be used for any purpose.93   
The vast majority of Americans have supported the home inter-
est deduction94—more than those who actually take the deduction.95 
As a result, “the [mortgage interest deduction] was deemed ‘un-
touchable’ because it was considered an important part of promoting 
homeownership.”96 Before the 2017 tax reform, homeowners were 
also allowed an unlimited deduction of their state and local taxes 
(“SALT”).97 This deduction included both state income taxes and 
real property taxes.98  
Yet, the tax law did not support homeownership to the maximum 
extent. For example, these homeowner-friendly deductions were be-
low-the-line, competing with the standard deduction.99 Therefore, in 
order to benefit from them, taxpayers would have to itemize.100 Fur-
thermore, the tax law treated commuting costs as non-deductible 
                                                                                                                            
PROBS. 233, 236 (2010) (quoting Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions 
Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L. REV. 679, 713 (1988)).  
 92  § 163(h). 
 93  See Daniel Hemel & Kyle Rozema, Inequality and the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction, 70 TAX L. REV. 667, 671 (2017); Frederick, supra note 91, at 43. 
 94  See Morrow, supra note 2, at 760–61 (“In a recent poll conducted by The 
New York Times, more than 90 percent of respondents supported the mortgage 
interest deduction.”). 
 95  “Largely, the support stems from one of the following: people mistakenly 
believing that the MID promotes homeownership; or people wanting to preserve 
the deduction for the day when they will buy their first home, or if they are already 
homeowners, a more expensive home.” Taite, supra note 2, at 365. 
 96  Id. at 364. But see Frederick, supra note 91, at 62 (“Moreover, since the 
interest deduction preceded the rise of the widespread American mortgage market, 
scholars have never been able to compare a market without the deduction to one 
with it, or observe the effects of introducing the deduction as a new variable to 
the market.”). 
 97  § 164(a).  
 98  Id. For a history of the federal deduction for state and local taxes, see 
Gladriel Shobe, Disaggregating the State and Local Tax Deduction, 35 VA. TAX 
REV. 327, 337–40 (2016). 
 99  See, e.g., Shobe, supra note 98, at 375; Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in 
State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REV. 407, 426 (2010). 
 100  See Shobe, supra note 98, at 375. 
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personal expenses, without consideration of the effects this might 
have on homeownership incentives.101  
The federal government also encourages homeownership 
through several other efforts.102 For example, Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac provide secondary mortgage markets that increase the sup-
ply of lenders and mortgages.103 The United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) works to create quality 
affordable homes.104 For decades, the federal government has pro-
moted new financing strategies and the expansion of the mortgage 
market with the explicit goal of increasing homeownership rates.105  
Thus, the federal government has long offered homeownership-
friendly provisions, including in the tax code. The 2017 tax reform 
reversed this approach by targeting the mortgage interest and SALT 
deductions. 
                                                                                                                            
 101  See Tsilly Dagan, Commuting, 26 VA. TAX REV. 185, 190–91, 202–03 
(2006) (noting that the tax law treats the decision to live far away from where one 
works as a personal preference, even when taxpayers must live far away from 
work because their work location is necessarily isolated). 
 102  “For decades, the federal government has sought to increase the rate of 
homeownership for Americans. This support for homeownership can be seen in 
three major areas: (1) regulation and participation in the financial markets, (2) 
direct financial subsidies, and (3) tax policy.” Julie D. Lawton, Limited Equity 
Cooperatives: The Non-Economic Value of Homeownership, 43 WASH U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 187, 189 (2013).  
 103  For further background, see David Reiss, The Federal Government’s Im-
plied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will 
Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1027–42, 1053–54 (2008); Winston 
Sale, Effect of the Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on Afforda-
ble Housing, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 287, 289–95 
(2009). 
 104  See Kristen David Adams, Homeownership: American Dream or Illusion 
of Empowerment?, 60 S.C. L. REV. 573, 587 (2009) (“The program’s goal was to 
achieve record high homeownership in six years.”). 
 105  See id.; Daniel Immergluck, Private Risk, Public Risk: Public Policy, Mar-
ket Development, and the Mortgage Crisis, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 453–54 
(2009) (“By the early 1920s, the federal government had become a supporting—
and sometimes catalyzing or initiating—actor in the promotion of homeownership 
in the United States.”); Todd Zywicki, The Behavioral Law and Economics of 
Fixed-Rate Mortgages (and Other Just-So Stories), 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 157, 
164–65 (2013) (describing the uniqueness of the traditional 30-year mortgage fi-
nancing mechanism in the United States, the stability it gives consumers, and its 
costs to homeowners and the economy). 
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B. Tax Reform on Homeownership 
In late 2017, Congress enacted the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,106 the 
most comprehensive tax reform since 1986.107 It made numerous 
changes to the taxation of corporations, individual income, and es-
tates.108 For individuals, tax brackets were lowered and the standard 
deduction was doubled, meaning that fewer taxpayers will take the 
below-the-line deductions, which include homeownership tax 
breaks.109 
Those who still itemize can deduct the interest on the first $1 
million of mortgage debt incurred before December 15, 2017.110 
Homes purchased after December 15, 2017 are limited to a mort-
gage interest deduction on only the first $750,000 of mortgage 
debt,111 while mortgage debt on a second home qualifies for an in-
terest deduction to the extent that the first mortgage does not exceed 
$750,000.112 The new law eliminates the deduction for home equity 
debt.113  
In regard to the SALT deduction, taxpayers are now limited to a 
$10,000 deduction.114 This limitation was a compromise after law-
makers discussed eliminating this deduction entirely.115 In sum, the 
2017 tax legislation curtailed the tax advantages of homeownership 
through major cuts to both the mortgage interest and SALT deduc-
tions. 
III. HOMEOWNERSHIP AS SAVINGS 
While homeownership has several benefits, there is one benefit 
in particular that should make lawmakers pause: homeownership as 
                                                                                                                            
 106  See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), Pub. L. No. 115-
97, 131 Stat. 2054 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 107  Christopher H. Hanna, Some Observations on Corporate or Business Tax 
Reform, 68 SMU L. REV. 595, 595 (2015). 
 108  See TCJA §§ 11001(a), 13001(a). 
 109  See §§ 11001(a), 11021(a). 
 110  See § 11043(a).  
 111  See id. 
 112  See id. 
 113  See id. 
 114  See § 11042(a). 
 115  See Maya Rhodan, Congress Wants to Eliminate the State and Local Tax 
Deduction. What’s That?, TIME (Oct. 6, 2017), http://time.com/4972976/tax-re-
form-state-local-tax-deduction-explainer/.  
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a tool for wealth creation. Simply put, homeownership is a form of 
forced savings. 116  Homeowners benefit from “wealth generation 
and inter-generational wealth transfer, protection from inflation, 
[and] increased borrowing power.”117 
A. The Benefits and Drawbacks of Supporting Homeownership 
There are numerous benefits and drawbacks to supporting home-
ownership. These must all be considered in determining tax policy.  
The often-cited reasons for the federal government support of 
homeownership are varied and important. Homeownership has been 
described as “an important component of ‘social, economic,[] psy-
chic,’ and financial well-being.”118 Often, homeownership is seen as 
a milestone.119  
Homeownership also has notable advantages for families with 
children, including permanency, stability, and security.120 Families 
do not move as much when they own as compared to when they rent, 
thus avoiding school transfers for children and enhancing educa-
tional outcomes.121 Studies show that compared to the children of 
renters, the children of homeowners are more emotionally stable, 
have fewer behavioral problems at school, and are less likely to be 
arrested or become teenage parents.122 
Many people prefer to remain homeowners even after raising 
their families, including members of the older generations who want 
                                                                                                                            
 116  “Economists have argued there are two main purposes of homeownership. 
The first is housing as a utility for consumption, and the second is housing as an 
investment vehicle.” Lawton, supra note 102, at 216. 
 117  powell, supra note 2, at 623. 
 118  Id. (citing Matt A. Barreto et al., Homeownership: Southern California’s 
New Political Fault Line?, 42 URB. AFF. REV. 315, 315–16 (2007)). 
 119  See Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 890, 899 (2011). 
 120  See Taite, supra note 2, at 373–74 (“While some research supported the 
premise that neighborhoods are important, Ellen and Turner found that other fac-
tors, such as family dynamics and parents’ education and income levels, signifi-
cantly impact a child’s educational attainment.”) (citing Ingrid Gould Ellen & 
Margery Austin Turner, Does Neighborhood Matter? Assessing Recent Evidence, 
8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 833, 846 (1997)). 
 121  Dickerson, Public Interest, supra note 81, at 848.  
 122  Id. 
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to age in their homes.123 Single people also seek homeownership.124 
“[O]wners report that they are in better shape physically and have 
less psychological distress than renters.”125 Homeowners take pride 
in ownership and invest in improving neighborhoods for all resi-
dents.126 Much scholarship addresses the civic virtues resulting from 
residents’ stake in their community.127  
However, there are also drawbacks to supporting homeowner-
ship.128 Many commentators have underscored the disadvantages of 
homeownership and the tax policies that favor it.129  
                                                                                                                            
 123  Andrea J. Boyack, Equitably Housing (Almost) Half A Nation of Renters, 
65 BUFF. L. REV. 109, 114 (2017). 
 124  See powell, supra note 2, at 623. 
 125  Dickerson, Public Interest, supra note 81, at 847. 
 126  Id. at 848–50; Janet Reno, Essay, The Criminal Justice System: Towards 
the 21st Century, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 39, 49 (1994) (“We can do so 
much in terms of developing programs that provide affordable housing and reach-
ing out to give people throughout America the understanding that there is potential 
for home ownership and for home pride.”).  
 127  See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why 
Home Ownership is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 191–92 (2009) 
(“Home ownership is also thought to benefit the individual homeowner’s com-
munity since homeowners tend to be concerned, involved citizens who are more 
likely to participate in local civic organizations, who will lobby for long-term or 
high quality community services.”); Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten 
American Dream, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 417, 440–41 (2008) (noting that despite 
homeownership’s financial risks, investment limitations, and mobility constraints, 
there are sociological and psychological benefits that include greater political in-
volvement and participation in local voluntary organizations, as well as greater 
personal satisfaction); Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: 
The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1347, 1354 (2000) (“This ‘homeowner activism’ creates a better community for 
all residents. Arguably, homeowners are better citizens than renters, and thus 
wider home ownership creates economic and political stability.”). 
 128  See Lawton, supra note 102, at 192. 
 129  See Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits 
of Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157, 167–73 (2005) (summa-
rizing many of the arguments made by others against tax subsidies for housing, 
including its costs to the federal treasury). “After so many years of the federal 
government’s promotion and support of homeownership, commentators and ad-
vocates have raised the question of whether homeownership remains a defensible 
strategy, particularly for low- and moderate-income residents.” Lawton, supra 
note 102, at 192. 
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Commentators note that homeownership is not necessarily good 
public policy.130 They point to the risks, to both individual home-
owners and the economy, of investing in homeownership to the ex-
clusion of everything else. For instance, many people use significant 
credit in their home purchases,131 but consumer debt is not healthy 
                                                                                                                            
 130  See Snider, supra note 129, at 167–73.  
 131  See Adams, supra note 104, at 599. “[T]he irresponsible extension of credit 
is not limited to subprime borrowers. Instead, and especially as job losses continue 
to mount, delinquencies and foreclosures among prime borrowers are increasing 
as well.” Id. at 587–88.  
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for the economy.132 Credit is particularly risky in economic down-
turns,133 where the loss of a home’s value may result in foreclo-
sure134 and cumulative effects on the economy.135 The risks are es-
pecially pronounced for lower income and minority groups who are 
more likely to be targeted as victims in mortgage schemes.136 
                                                                                                                            
 132  “High debt consumption rates negatively impacted homeowners and the 
economy.” Taite, supra note 2, at 369. “Between 1981 and 1991, home equity 
debt increased from $60 billion to $357 billion.” Id. 
 133  See, e.g., Laurie S. Goodman & Sherrill Shaffer, Commentary and Debate, 
The Economics of Deposit Insurance: A Critical Evaluation of Proposed Reforms, 
2 YALE J. ON REG. 145, 153–55 (1984). For a discussion on housing characteris-
tics from 2000 to 2010, see CHRISTOPHER MAZUR & ELLEN WILSON, U.S. CEN-
SUS BUREAU, HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS: 2010 (2011), https://www.census.gov 
/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-07.pdf. For example, “[h]omeowners were a ma-
jority in nearly all counties, however many of these counties saw homeownership 
rates decrease during the decade.” Id. at 9. 
 134  “The risk of losing one’s home through forced sale at the hands of a cred-
itor, in a foreclosure or in the context of bankruptcy, raises important issues con-
cerning the acclamation of homeownership as a universal value for women and 
men . . . .” Lorna Fox, Re-Possessing “Home”: A Re-Analysis of Gender, Home-
ownership and Debtor Default for Feminist Legal Theory, 14 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 423, 431 (2008). 
 135  See Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and 
the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 
973–74 (2010) (“The collapse of the U.S. housing market has left millions of 
homeowners owing more on their mortgages than their homes are worth. As a 
historical snapshot, more than 34% of all mortgaged properties in the United 
States were ‘underwater’ as of the third quarter of 2009. The national numbers 
hide the full extent of the problem, however, as the percentage of underwater 
mortgages has been much higher in the regions suffering the worst price declines. 
Again, as a snapshot, by the end of 2009, 65% of mortgage borrowers in Nevada 
were already underwater, 48% of homeowners were underwater in Arizona, 45% 
were underwater in Florida, 37% were underwater in Michigan, and 35% were 
underwater in California.”). “This housing crisis contributed to what has become 
known as the Great Recession.” Taite, supra note 2, at 376 (explaining that the 
tax deduction for home equity incentivized homeowners to take out home equity 
loans, raising the loan-to-value ratio of their property, while high loan-to-value 
ratios were linked to the housing crisis of the early 2000s).  
 136  Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical 
Evaluation of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 
69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 378 (1994); see also Charles Lewis Nier III, The Shadow of 
Credit: The Historical Origins of Racial Predatory Lending and Its Impact upon 
African American Wealth Accumulation, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 
192–93 (2007).  
 
248 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:227 
Furthermore, people’s optimism often means that they are sur-
prised by financial troubles that may arise during homeowner-
ship,137 as seen in the recent housing bubble.138 Even when they are 
financially overwhelmed, however, people do not necessarily want 
to sacrifice homeownership despite its costs.139  
Regardless of affordability issues, the economics of homeown-
ership may not make sense for all people, such as the transaction 
costs associated with a short period of homeownership.140 There are 
                                                                                                                            
 137  Forrester, supra note 136, at 385; see also Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky 
Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment 
Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 757–61 (2009) 
(discussing how optimism biases risk-assessment in related contexts). 
 138  “Historically homeownership in the United States has been about 60%. At 
the height of the bubble, homeownership was 69%. That actually has a lot to do 
with why we got into all this trouble. An awful lot of people who couldn’t afford 
homes bought them.” Joe Nocera, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 52 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (2010). “And yet, the 2008 economic collapse was sparked by overin-
vestment in real property. Homeowners were not establishing economic security 
by building equity in their homes, but were borrowing against the perceived in-
creased values of their homes through home equity lines of credit, the interest on 
which was deductible.” Morrow, supra note 2, at 754. See also Peter W. Salsich, 
Jr., Homeownership—Dream or Disaster?, 21 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COM-
MUNITY DEV. L. 17, 27 (2012) (noting the increasing sizes and costs of houses 
available for purchase). 
 139  Taite, supra note 2, at 374–75 (“Generally, the presumption is that if home-
owners have negative equity, they will simply choose to abandon their homes, but 
research shows that the majority of homeowners remain in their homes against 
their economic interests. Some of these homeowners can take advantage of addi-
tional government financial assistance available through the Troubled Asset Re-
lief Program (TARP). However, by providing direct financial assistance to trou-
bled homeowners, TARP also contributes to the federal deficit.”). This is also to 
the detriment of the government:  
The financial setbacks associated with a foreclosure eliminate 
most, if not all, of the wealth built by the household. In addition, 
the tax benefits received by the homeowner—such as the MID, 
real estate tax deduction, and TARP relief—are eliminated 
through the foreclosure process. In these situations, not only 
does the taxpayer lose his home, but the government forfeits 
revenue. 
Id. at 375. 
 140  Robert C. Ellickson, Legal Sources of Residential Lock-Ins: Why French 
Households Move Half as Often as U.S. Households, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 373, 
382–83 (2012). 
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also maintenance and property taxes.141 Often, the beneficiaries of 
high homeownership rates are realtors, homebuilders, and financial 
institutions.142  
Tax subsidies for homeownership might also be economically 
inefficient.143 For example, the mortgage interest deduction does not 
emphasize the purchase decision, but the quantity decision.144 This 
contributes to urban sprawl.145  
Meanwhile, the reasons for supporting homeownership are sim-
ilar to those for supporting renting—everyone can benefit from hav-
ing pride in their home and neighborhoods, not just homeowners.146 
A mobile labor market that is not tied down by homeownership is 
also beneficial to the economy.147  
Additionally, reducing homeownership deductions may make 
certain housing cheaper because house prices may fall to offset the 
loss of tax incentives.148 Indeed, housing affordability has become a 
                                                                                                                            
 141  See Jonathan Spader & Christopher Herbert, Waiting for Homeownership: 
Assessing the Future of Homeownership, 2015–2035, 37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 
267, 269 (2017).  
My conclusion at the end of this exercise is that a family earning 
the median American household income and making the me-
dian monthly mortgage payment would pay $177 to $468 each 
month above what it can afford; notably, the median monthly 
mortgage payment is $260 above the 28% maximum mortgage 
debt load for a family earning the median household income.  
Adams, supra note 104, at 579–80. 
 142  See Lily Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, 65 
ALA. L. REV. 187, 210 (2013). 
 143  See William T. Mathias, Curtailing the Economic Distortions of the Mort-
gage Interest Deduction, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 43, 44, 53–65 (1996). 
 144  See Alan L. Feld, Redeployment of Tax Expenditures for Housing, 23 TAX 
NOTES 1441, 1448 (1984). 
 145  Williams, Rhetoric, supra note 1, at 328. 
 146  See Arlo Chase, Rethinking the Homeownership Society: Rental Stability 
Alternative, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 61, 74–75 (2009). 
 147  See William P. Kratzke, The (Im)Balance of Externalities in Employment-
Based Exclusions from Gross Income, 60 TAX LAW. 1, 17 (2006). 
 148  Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1501 n.20 (1999) (“[T]he 
mortgage interest deduction has made homes more valuable and has undoubtedly 
been capitalized into home prices.”); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax Re-
form for Fairness and Simplicity: Let Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 459, 486 (1993) (suggesting that the mortgage interest deduction 
is mostly capitalized into the price of a home); see also William G. Gale et al., 
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major problem in many parts of the United States.149 This is partic-
ularly true in states that most benefit from the SALT and mortgage 
interest deductions—big cities in high-tax jurisdictions.150 However, 
to the extent that home values will decrease with the reduction of 
homeownership deductions, wealth creation would be eliminated for 
those who bought their houses under the previous tax laws.151  
                                                                                                                            
Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 TAX NOTES 1171, 1171 
(2007) (arguing that the mortgage interest deduction “serves mainly to raise the 
price of housing and land”).  
 149  “From 1990-2000, affordability problems increased by 52%, two-and-a-
half times the rate of homeownership increases. Low-income families and minor-
ities are hardest hit by decreasing affordability.” powell, supra note 2, at 622–23. 
For further background on affordability in the housing context, see Paulette J. 
Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing: Systemic Issues Requir-
ing Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 418–25 (2004). 
 150  “Home prices have traditionally been highest in the West, followed in order 
by the Northeast, the South, and the Midwest.” Adams, supra note 104, at 581. 
See also MAZUR & WILSON, supra note 133, at 8 (“As in 2000, New York ranked 
at the bottom with respect to homeownership (53.3 percent) in 2010.”). 
 151  See generally Holden Lewis, 5 Homeownership Changes Coming Under 
New Tax Law, NERD WALLET (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/ 
mortgages/6-ways-tax-plan-could-change-homeownership (discussing how some 
people believe that tax reform will cause a plunge in home values). But see Tobie 
Stanger, Home Values Are Rising, So Grab the Benefits and Avoid the Risks, CON-
SUMER REP. (July 14, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/home-equity-
products/home-values-rising-grab-benefits-and-avoid-risks/. 
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Finally, there are some federalism concerns surrounding home-
ownership federal tax breaks, particularly in regard to the SALT de-
duction. 152  The SALT deduction has been described as “in ef-
fect . . . a federal matching grant for eligible state levies.”153 The un-
derlying idea is that some taxpayers are subsidizing others who take 
large SALT deductions in high-tax states.154  
In sum, there are some drawbacks to a public policy that sup-
ports homeownership. Yet, there are benefits as well, including the 
often overlooked benefit of homeownership as a forced savings tool. 
B. Homeownership as Savings 
Homeownership is a form of forced savings, starting with the 
down payment and then continuing with monthly payments for often 
decades.155 The mortgage payments force people to contribute reg-
ular amounts of money that usually produce a return when it comes 
                                                                                                                            
 152  See, e.g., Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should 
the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. 
REV. 1389, 1394 (2004) (“Together, these features of the deduction for state and 
local taxes give state and local governments an incentive to raise revenues through 
property and income taxes on high-income taxpayers—an outcome that is exactly 
contrary to the central normative prescription of fiscal federalism regarding the 
assignment of redistributive policies to the national government.”). See also Ruth 
Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CAL. L. REV. 975, 1021–25 (2011); 
Darien Shanske, How Less Can Be More: Using the Federal Income Tax to Sta-
bilize State and Local Finance, 31 VA. TAX REV. 413, 423–24 (2012). 
 153  Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The 
Alternative Minimum Tax As A Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
187, 191 (2010). 
 154  Cf. id. at 214 (“[T]he SALT deduction functions as a subsidy for state and 
local governments. First, it induces a substitution effect in favor of state and local 
taxation. A local taxpayer facing the choice between savings, private consumption, 
and consumption of government services (i.e., higher taxes) should prefer gov-
ernment service because a dollar’s worth of government services costs her only 
$0.65, while a dollar’s worth of savings or private consumption costs $1. The 
deduction also likely increases demand for local government through an income 
effect. Assuming local government services are a so-called ‘normal’ good, in 
which demand rises as income rises, the taxpayer’s higher after-federal-tax wealth 
should produce a greater demand for local government services.”). 
 155  Dickerson, Public Interest, supra note 81, at 846. (“Potential homebuyers 
had to save money to make a 20% down payment or they would not qualify for 
the low-cost fifteen- to thirty-year self-amortizing mortgages that were guaranteed 
by the U.S. government. The new homeowner then had to continue to save enough 
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time to sell.156 Not only do people then retrieve the money they in-
vested in the house, but they also often benefit from appreciation—
tax-free up to $500,000 per married couple due to the exclusion of 
gain from the sale of a principal residence.157  
Homeownership has historically been seen as an investment for 
Americans. For an American family, home equity is the typical and 
most important financial asset, as well as an important vehicle for 
transmitting wealth from generation to generation.158 It is the most 
significant marital asset for many couples in a divorce, serving as a 
major source of funds for support obligations.159 Those who rent 
have less worth than homeowners.160 As a result, a “move away 
from real property residential ownership leaves a void regarding 
available pathways to advance economically within society.”161  
                                                                                                                            
money to make equal monthly loan payments of principal and interest for fifteen 
to thirty years.”). 
 156  Id. 
 157  26 U.S.C. § 121 (2012). 
 158  powell, supra note 2, at 623; Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership 
and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53, 65 (2006) (“Homeownership is the 
largest component of the wealth portfolios of both white and black families. In 
2002, housing wealth accounted for 63% of all wealth in African-American fam-
ilies.”).  
 159  D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 
614 (6th ed. 2016). 
 160  See Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 627 (2002) (re-
viewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VAL-
UES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-
USE POLICIES (2001)) (“In 1998, the median family income of renters was less 
than half that of homeowners, and the median family net worth of renters was less 
than one-thirtieth that of homeowners.”); Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: 
Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 591, 627 
n.167 (1998) (“[T]he median net worth of owner-occupiers is $77,183 compared 
to $2203 median net worth for renters.”); Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of 
Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not Enough, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1777, 1790 (2004) [hereinafter Warren, The Economics of Race] (“[M]ost renters 
have far lower total net worth than their home-owning counterparts. The differ-
ences are not confined only to homes. Renters have fewer assets of every kind—
stocks, bonds, retirement accounts, cars, personal property, small businesses, and 
so on.”). 
 161  Kristen Barnes, “Pennies on the Dollar”: Reallocating Risk and Defi-
ciency Judgment Liability, 66 S.C. L. REV. 243, 254–55 n.58 (2014). 
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In her academic research, Senator Warren has contended that 
homeownership is widely considered a hallmark of middle class fi-
nancial stability.162 Analyzing data from 2001, she found that “more 
than two-thirds of all households—67.7%—were homeowners, and 
the average value of the house they owned was $122,000,” but there 
were racial disparities in homeownership rates and home values—
“[a]mong non-Hispanic white families, homeownership rates in 
2001 were at 74.3%, while Hispanic and black families’ homeown-
ership rates trailed at 47.3% and 47.7% respectively.”163 
Homeownership costs may lead to the lack of retirement savings 
because people are investing so much of their income in their 
houses.164 When examining how people spent their money, Senator 
Warren found housing to be a major item.165 Thus, in contrast to 
lackluster retirement saving, Americans strive to own a home, mak-
ing the mortgage interest and SALT deductions among the largest 
tax subsidies in the previous federal income tax code.166 Homeown-
ership might as well be a 401(k), except that, unlike 401(k)s, people 
do not ignore homeownership—its best feature and the very reason 
that tax policy undercutting it poses a problem.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR TAX REFORM 
All of this is not to say that homeownership should be the pri-
mary vehicle for saving, but rather an acknowledgement that it is. 
This suggests that people should receive more tax relief for home-
ownership, not less. Reducing tax breaks for homeownership is in-
consistent with the policy of supporting saving. Given that home-
ownership is a way of saving, many people have argued to expand, 
                                                                                                                            
 162  Warren, The Economics of Race, supra note 160, at 1789.  
 163  Id. at 1788. Unfortunately, retirement savings mimic this. Eric W. Orts, 
Corporate Law and Business Theory, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1102 (2017) 
(“From 1989 to 2013, average retirement savings for white families grew from 
about $31,500 to almost $130,500. This compares to average savings for African-
American families over the same period increasing from around $5,500 to only 
about $19,000. Average savings for Hispanic families similarly increased from 
around $7,000 to only $12,500.”). 
 164  See Warren, The Over-Consumption Myth, supra note 82, at 1495–98. 
 165  Id. at 1495. 
 166  See Stark, supra note 152, at 1394. 
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not curtail, homeownership tax benefits to more people,167 including 
veterans168 and racial minorities.169 Instead, there has been a de-
crease in homeownership,170 especially among young people who 
are saddled with more debt than previous generations.171  
Two broad groups of people who do not benefit from the tax 
laws favoring homeownership are those who do not own a home and 
those who do not itemize.172 The latter group consists of well over 
                                                                                                                            
 167  See Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 329, 366–74 (2009) (suggesting solutions to increase equitable distribution 
of homeownership tax benefits); Kenya Covington & Rodney Harrell, From Rent-
ing to Homeownership: Using Tax Incentives to Encourage Homeownership 
Among Renters, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 113–16 (2007) (proposing “the basic 
outline of a federal renter-to-homeowner program. The program has three basic 
features: (1) it is structured as a one-time, non-refundable tax credit; (2) it is uni-
versal–that is, it is not restricted by income level, age, or disability status; (3) it is 
designed to promote homeownership.”). 
 168  See Florence Wagman Roisman, National Ingratitude: The Egregious De-
ficiencies of the United States’ Housing Programs for Veterans and the “Public 
Scandal” of Veterans’ Homelessness, 38 IND. L. REV. 103, 162–75 (2005).  
 169  “Wealth, as distinguished from income, offers the key to understanding 
racial stratification in the United States, especially the persistence of racial ine-
quality in a post-civil rights era in which minorities have made remarkable ad-
vances.” Shapiro, supra note 158, at 53. 
 170  Spader & Herbert, supra note 141, at 267–68 (“A historic decline in the 
homeownership rate has generated substantial discussion over the future of home-
ownership in the United States. After peaking at 69.2% in 2004, the national 
homeownership rate declined steadily to 63.7% in 2015 according to the Housing 
Vacancy Survey. Although this decline returned the overall homeownership rate 
to approximately the level it held between 1985 and 1995, the homeownership 
rates for multiple age cohorts have fallen well below their 1995 levels. For exam-
ple, the homeownership rate for households between ages 35 and 44 increased 
from 65.2% in 1995 to 69.3% in 2005 before falling to 58.5% in 2015. The overall 
homeownership rate has not fallen as far as these age-specific rates only because 
the aging of the population during this period has increased the number of house-
holds in older age cohorts where homeownership rates are highest.”). 
 171  Id. at 290 (noting “young households’ slowed rates of homeownership”). 
 172  Taite, supra note 2, at 365. As a result, “the MID provides no benefits to 
low-income households and only minimal benefits to middle-income households. 
It does not help renters. And it gives little assistance to the elderly who either are 
no longer servicing mortgages or who have too little income to receive any bene-
fit.” Ventry, supra note 91, at 280. See also Feld, supra note 144, at 1443 (noting 
that tax benefits for homeownership “flow disproportionately” to high-income 
taxpayers due to their tie to marginal tax rates, rise with increased housing con-
sumption, and are unavailable to nonitemizers). 
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half of Americans who take the standard deduction.173 This number 
only increases with the near doubling of the standard deduction in 
the 2017 tax legislation.174 Those who do not pay federal income 
taxes also do not benefit from any of these tax laws.175 Thus, some 
commentators have suggested an above-the-line deduction for 
homeownership tax benefits.176 They have also proposed turning the 
mortgage interest deduction into a credit instead of a deduction.177  
Other commentators have suggested a one-time grant or loan as-
sistance to help with upfront costs, which do not have some of the 
distortions of other approaches.178 These commentators would trade 
certain tax expenditures for direct financial assistance grants to 
Americans seeking homeownership.179 
                                                                                                                            
 173  Jonathan Barry Forman & Roberta F. Mann, Making the Internal Revenue 
Service Work, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 725, 732 (2015). 
 174  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11021(a), 
131 Stat. 2054, 2072–73 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. § 
163(c)(7)). 
 175  Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support 
for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 
179, 208 (2013) (noting the proportion of population that does not owe federal 
income taxes is forty-seven percent (47%)). 
 176  See, e.g., Senate Committee on Finance Releases Economic and Commu-
nity Development Option Paper, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (May 
17, 2013), https://nlihc.org/article/senate-committee-finance-releases-economic-
and-community-development-option-paper. 
 177  See, e.g., Brown, supra note 167, at 368–70; Ventry, supra note 91, at 282. 
 178  See, e.g., Taite, supra note 2, at 387 (“My proposal adopts Surrey’s pro-
posal for a one-time grant, but limits the grant assistance to households earning 
$50,000 or less. This grant amount would be limited to 10% of the purchase price 
(up to $8,000), and the taxpayer would have the option to apply and receive ap-
proval for the grant prior to purchasing the home. The grant would be verified and 
signed by both the purchaser and the seller. Basing the grant amount on a percent-
age of the home price necessarily limits the grant amount.”). Taite further explains 
that “[b]y providing specific one-time assistance, the government provides a more 
direct way to promote homeownership without encouraging homeowners to over-
spend,” which “removes tax policy from the equation.” Id. (“By placing the home-
ownership responsibility in the hands of the taxpayer, he will most likely purchase 
a home within his price range. Finally, providing assistance with upfront costs 
removes one of the first barriers to homeownership for low-and middle-income 
taxpayers.”). See also Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied 
Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental 
Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352, 360–61 (1970). 
 179  See Surrey, supra note 178, at 360–61. 
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State governors are attempting to get around the curtailment of 
these tax benefits, attacking their constitutionality or setting up tax 
payments as charitable contributions.180 Perhaps future politicians 
will re-introduce homeownership benefits to the federal tax code,181 
or perhaps their curtailment is necessary to help balance the budget 
when making other tax cuts. In the end, however, the role of home-
ownership in savings should make lawmakers consider augmenting 
homeownership tax rules, not weakening them.  
CONCLUSION 
In sum, homeownership is more than just an American dream 
and tax reform should be mindful of it. In reality, homeownership is 
a savings vehicle. While traditional retirement savings are incentiv-
ized by the tax law, Americans do not save much outside of home-
ownership.  
Yet, the 2017 tax legislation reduced support for homeowner-
ship. The tax reform targeting homeownership, such as curtailing or 
eliminating the deductions for mortgage interest and SALT, frus-
trates the American public policy of encouraging homeownership. 
There are many reasons that, for decades, the public policy position 
in the United States has been to encourage homeownership, includ-
ing the fact that homeownership is an important savings tool for 
Americans.  
No doubt, the tax code and any related reform are compli-
cated,182 invariably picking winners and losers. Often, the meaning 
                                                                                                                            
 180  See, e.g., Annie Nova & Darla Mercado, High-Tax States Plan Worka-
rounds to the Federal SALT Deduction, CNBC (Jan. 20, 2018, 11:01 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/19/high-tax-states-plan-workarounds-to-the-fed-
eral-salt-deduction.html (“In early January [2018], California Senate leader 
[Kevin] de León introduced a bill that would allow residents to pay some of their 
state taxes to the California Excellence Fund, a state charity. In turn, taxpayers 
would be able to deduct the amount of their charitable contribution on their federal 
returns.”). 
 181  See, e.g., Cristina Marcos, NY, NJ Republicans Show Early Opposition to 
Tax Bill, HILL (Nov. 2, 2017, 1:49 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house 
/358458-ny-nj-republicans-oppose-tax-bill (discussing some House members’ 
opposition to the proposed tax bill, specifically because it initially aimed to to 
eliminate state and local tax deduction). 
 182  Robin Cooper Feldman, Consumption Taxes and the Theory of General 
and Individual Taxation, 21 VA. TAX REV. 293, 330 (2002) (“Everyone agrees 
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of fairness is grey or dependent on ideology, but there are several 
guideposts.183 The federal income taxation system aims for “neutral-
ity, efficiency, and simplicity.”184 Further tax reform should mind 
these goals in the context of the importance of homeownership as a 
fundamental savings tool.  
                                                                                                                            
that the current income tax system is horribly complicated.”); Stephanie Hunter 
McMahon, What Innocent Spouse Relief Says About Wives and the Rest of Us, 37 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 141, 162 (2014) (“[T]he tax system is complicated, and 
many people rely on accountants or software to prepare their returns.”).  
 183  There are at least two aspects of fairness in the context of tax. First, there 
is the notion of “horizontal equity,” or that similarly situated individuals should 
be treated the same. Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 
1324–25 (2008). Second, there is the concept of “vertical equity,” or that the tax 
treatment of differently-situated persons should be fair—a form of distributive 
justice. Id. at 1324.  
 184  Reginald Mombrun, Let’s Protect Our Economy and Democracy from 
Paris Hilton: The Case for Keeping the Estate Tax, 33 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 61, 83–
84 (2007); see also Hayes Holderness, Taxing Privacy, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. 
& POL’Y 1, 7 (2013) (“The principle of neutrality holds that a tax should not 
change the economic decision making of individuals by not discriminating be-
tween different types of income, expenditures or other economic activities.”).  
